Regulatory monitoring and university financial reporting quality: agency and resource dependence perspectives by Tao, Lei & Greenwood, Margaret
Regulatory monitoring and university 
financial reporting quality: agency and 
resource dependence perspectives 
Article 
Published Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY) 
Open Access 
Tao, L. and Greenwood, M. (2020) Regulatory monitoring and 
university financial reporting quality: agency and resource 
dependence perspectives. Financial Accountability & 
Management. faam12244. ISSN 1468-0408 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12244 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/88647/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/faam.12244 
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Received: 3 February 2017 Revised: 21October 2019 Accepted: 19 November 2019
DOI: 10.1111/faam.12244
OR I G I NA L A RT I C L E
Regulatorymonitoring and university financial
reporting quality: Agency and resource
dependency perspectives
Margaret J. Greenwood Lei Tao
University of Bath School ofManagement,
University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, BA2
7AY, United Kingdom
Correspondence
Lei Tao,HenleyBusiness School,University of
Reading,Whiteknights, Reading,RG66UD,
UnitedKingdom.
Email: lei.tao@henley.ac.uk
Abstract
In this paper we exploit the complementarities between agency the-
ory and resource dependence theory to investigate the influence of
regulatory monitoring on financial reporting quality in the higher
education sector. Our setting is U.K. universities. Using 14 years of
data over the period 2002–2015, we find that financial reporting
quality, (proxied by discretionary accruals), improves with the inten-
sity of monitoring and resource dependence (proxied by the propor-
tion of funding from regulators/funding bodies). However, this pos-
itive influence is mitigated in the presence of a pre-discretionary
deficit, a proxy for the threat of regulatory intervention. A net ben-
efit frommonitoring remains for those universities with low levels of
regulated funding but in those where there is high dependence the
monitoring benefit is reversed and a pre-discretionary deficit is con-
verted to a small reported surplus. Both agency and resource depen-
dence theories offer explanations for these findings. Agency theory
predicts increased financial reporting quality with increased mon-
itoring and also a reduction in financial reporting quality to avoid
costly regulatory intervention. Resource dependence theory pre-
dicts that both these effectswill increasewith increaseddependence
on resources from a key provider. These findings extend our theoret-
ical understanding of financial reporting quality of universities, con-
tribute to the limited literature on financial reporting quality in the
not-for-profit andpublic sectors, and contribute to theexplorationof
the use of alternative theoretical frameworks in the domain of public
sector accounting.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The higher education sector has enjoyed a long period of expansion over the last 40 years (OECD, 2014) and, glob-
ally, now represents the second largest economic sector after healthcare (HM Government, 2013; Parker, 2013). In
the United Kingdom alone higher education contributes about £40bn (2.8%) of GDP and over £17bn to U.K. exports
(HM Government, 2013; Universities UK, 2014) while, internationally, the growth in the number of students seeking
higher education across national boundaries has been increasing exponentially (OECD, 2014). Despite the increas-
ing presence of for-profit universities, the vast majority are dependent to a significant extent on government funding
(European Commission, 2007). However, in a policy context that favours the marketisation of the higher education
sector, public funding has been declining and has been made increasingly conditional upon demanding institutional
accountability requirements. (Lapsley &Miller, 2004; Parker, 2013). In this environment a key concern for regulators,
both nationally and internationally, has been institutional financial sustainability (European University Association,
2008). A key resource for assessing financial sustainability and often used by sector regulators, are annual financial
statements (Universities UK, 2014). The use of financial statements for such regulatory decision making emphasises
the importance of understanding financial reporting quality in this distinctive not-for-profit and public sector setting.
However, while the commercialisation and financialisation of universities has been addressed in the higher educa-
tion and accounting literature (Christopher & Leung, 2015; Craig, Amernic, & Tourish, 2014; Czarniawska & Mazza,
2013; Parker, 2013), few empirical studies have investigated financial reporting quality in this setting (Christiaens &
DeWielemaker, 2003; Parker, 2013).
Steinberg (2010) and Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, and Jegers (2012) argue that new insights into the gover-
nance of not-for-profit entities can be generated by using agency theory in complementarity with other theoreti-
cal frameworks. Our aim in this paper is to extend our understanding of financial reporting quality in the not-for-
profit and public sectors by investigating the impact of regulatory monitoring in the higher education sector using
both agency and resource dependence perspectives. Agency theory represents the most common framework for
explaining financial reporting quality in the private sector (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). However, its applica-
tion in not-for-profit and public sectors has been subject to criticism because of the challenges posed by multiple
stakeholders, ambiguous organisational goals, and a weak incentive framework. Steinberg (2010) argues that these
issues hamper the potential of agency theory to resolve questions of accountability in not-for-profit organisations.
Perhaps as a consequence, our understanding of financial reporting quality in not-for-profit and public sectors is
largely limited to evidence of small surplus reporting (Ballantine, Forker, & Greenwood, 2007; Ferreira, Carvalho,
& Pinho, 2013; Hoerger, 1991; Leone & Van Horn, 2005) and small loss avoidance (Ballantine et al., 2007), con-
sistent with incentives to signal competence and efficiency to key stakeholders. In contrast, resource dependence
theory has been used extensively in the governance literature (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009) in both the pri-
vate and public sectors (Ward & Forker, 2017), but represents a relatively recent innovation in the financial report-
ing literature. This limited but growing literature includes a consideration of the impact of resource dependence
on the tendency to adopt Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Report-
ing Standards (IFRS) (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Verbruggen, Christiaens, & Milis, 2011), to
adopt program budgeting in Greece (Cohen & Karatzimas, 2014), and to increase disclosures in response to funders’
requirements (Thomson, 2010).
The setting for our study is U.K. universities and the investigation covers a sample period of 14 years from 2002 to
2015. U.K. universities derive a significant proportion of their revenue from the government via four funding bodies.1
The sector operates a system of regulation that involves progressive monitoring and intervention for the purposes of
protecting public money and student interests (Universities UK, 2014). A significant part of the system is the assess-
ment of organisational financial sustainability, as required by statute (s.68 Higher Education and Research Act, 2017).
Based on annual accountability returns from universities, these annual returns include audited financial statements
that have been prepared in accordance with the U.K. GAAP compliant Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP)
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for Further andHigher Education (Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), 2010, 2014;Office for Stu-
dents (OFS), 2018; Scottish Funding Council (SFC), 2014).
Agency theory predicts that financial reporting quality increases with increased monitoring because of reduced
information asymmetry and a consequent reduction in the scope for earningsmanagement. Resource dependence the-
ory further predicts that where funding providers are focused on the quality of financial governance, financial report-
ing quality will increase with increased dependence on funding. Both agency theory and resource dependence theory
predict a reduction in financial reporting quality when managers and organisations seek to report desired levels of
performance in order to avoid regulatory intervention and a loss of managerial autonomy. These effects, according to
resource dependence theory, increase with resource dependence.
Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality and the proportion of regulated funding
derived from the government funding bodies as a proxy for resource dependence, we find that financial report-
ing quality increases with resource dependence. We further find that, consistent with the rational self-interested
manager of agency theory, discretionary accruals are managed to avoid deficit reporting and that, consistent
with resource dependence theory, this response is strongest in those universities most dependent on regulated
funding.
This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First it extends the limited literature on financial
reporting quality in not-for-profit and public sectors in the context of higher education sector. Second, it generates
first-time insights into the interaction between the monitoring and incentive effects of regulation on financial report-
ing quality. Little attention has been paid to this interaction in the not-for-profit and public sectors with most inves-
tigations in for-profit settings (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002, 2005). Third, this paper contributes to the literature which
considers theory complementarity, in this case resource dependence theory and agency theory, in the context of finan-
cial reporting in the not-for-profit and public sectors.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature, Section 3 overviews the institutional setting, Sec-
tion4provides the theoretical basis forourhypotheses, Section5describesour researchmethod, andSection6 reports
our findings. We conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of the findings and their implications for practice, policy, and
future research.
2 PRIOR LITERATURE
In contrast with the private sector (Dechow et al., 2010) relatively little is known about the determinants of financial
reporting quality in the public and not-for-profit sectors. Such evidence as there is, is largely restricted to the reporting
of small surpluses which is consistent with incentives to signal competence and efficiency to important stakeholders
such as the providers of funds, service users, and the general public. In an early study, Hoerger (1991) finds lower earn-
ings variability in US non-profit hospitals as compared with for-profit hospitals. An explanation for this phenomenon
was subsequently providedby Leone andVanHorn (2005)who find that, in this same setting, bothdiscretionary spend-
ing and accruals aremanaged to report small surpluses. Ballantine et al. (2007) similarly find that accruals aremanaged
to report small surpluses in English NHS hospitals and that, in addition, there is an aversion to the reporting of small
deficits. Deficits, it is argued, signal weak financial control, while surpluses signal that financial resources are in excess
of those required to satisfy demand for services or that management capacity is insufficient to fully and effectively
deploy available financial resources. The avoidance of small deficits is also found to be incentivised by increased CEO
turnover (Ballantine, Forker, & Greenwood, 2008) and, in the case of Portuguese local authorities, by political consid-
erations just prior to an election (Ferreira et al., 2013).
The small number of studies that investigate the impact of external monitoring on not-for-profit financial reporting
generally adopt agency theory as a framework of analysis. Jones and Roberts (2006) and Krishnan and Yetman (2011)
for example find cost-shifting in US not-for-profits aimed at enhancing important performance ratios such as the pro-
gram ratio, a widely used measure of spending efficiency. However, this adverse impact on financial reporting quality
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was found to be moderated, in US not-for-profit hospitals, by the percentage of Medicare andMedicaid (government)
funding, a proxy for the intensity of systematic external monitoring (Krishnan & Yetman, 2011). This study provides
early evidence that is also consistentwith resource dependence predictions that an organisationwill orientate itself to
so as to demonstrate alignmentwith resource provider objectives. Similarly, Andrés-Alonso, Cruz, andRomero-Merino
(2006) find that, in Spanish not-for-profits, the efficiency of resource allocation is positively associated with the pro-
portion of donations from institutional donors who are assumed to engage in monitoring activities. However, when
regulatory intervention is threatened financial reporting quality is found to be adversely affected (Ballantine et al.,
2007; Greenwood, Baylis, & Tao, 2017).
We contribute to this literature by extending the literature that adopts complementary theoretical frameworks to
generate new insights into not-for-profit financial reporting quality in non-for-profit and public sectors with a specific
focus on the proportion of funding from regulators as a proxy both for resource dependence and intensity of monitor-
ing. Specifically, we contribute to our understanding of their interactions within an increasingly marketised external
environment characterised by growing constraints on funding from regulators combined with more intense perfor-
mance monitoring. We also contribute an empirical study to complement the limited, and mainly critical, literature on
the financial reporting quality in not-for-profit and public sectors.
3 INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY SETTING
The setting for our investigation is U.K. universities. Consistent with a wider programme of public sector reform, U.K.
universities are predominantly not-for-profit entities that are allowed considerable freedom about how they arrange
their affairs andmanage their strategic development. The threemain generators of university income are teaching and
research activities, with commercial income from student accommodation, consultancy contracts, and endowments
making up the balance. The funding bodies are the biggest funders of teaching and research in the United Kingdom
overall and they currently distribute about £4bn of public funds annually which account for over 32% of U.K. universi-
ties’ revenue during the period of our study. Academic teams generated additional research income (17%) by applying
for research grants from research councils andother research sponsors,while tuition fees levied on individual students
generated another 31% of income. This funding structure confers considerable power and influence on the regulators
over universities they fund.
Consistent with a policy environment heavily influenced by the doctrines of New PublicManagement (Hood, 1991,
1995; Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016) public funds are provided subject to regulation by independent regulators/funding
bodies such as HEFCE and SFC who subject universities to extensive financial monitoring (HM Treasury, 2013). Uni-
versities are required to send an annual accountability return to the regulator/funding body, which includes audited
financial statements. The financial statements are required to follow the sector’s SORP which is based on U.K. GAAP
(HEFCE, 2010; SFC 2014). This information combined with that obtained from other financial information submitted
via the TRAC (Transparent Approach to Costing) system is used to assess the financial sustainability of each university.
The TRAC return is consistent with the audited financial statements but also provides additional activity based cost
information relating to activity categories, most notably, research and teaching (Parker, 2013). This information is not
available to the public or to academic researchers but is requested by the regulators because of long-held concerns
that teaching activities may be used to subsidise research.
Although the detailed performance criteria andmetrics that the regulators use to assess financial sustainability are
not publicly available, the ability to generate sufficient income to cover the costs and allow a margin of surplus for
investment in the infrastructure is a key indicator in the risk-based approach adopted in the United Kingdom (HEFCE,
2010, 2014; HEFCW, 2017; SFC, 2014). The expectation of a surplus is incorporated into the financial memorandum
between universities and funding bodies and consecutive deficits are identified as a cause for concern and potential
intervention (e.g., HEFCE, 2010; HEFCW, 2017; SFC, 2014). Regulatory intervention, which is proportionate to the
assessed risk to financial sustainability, commenceswith requests for additional information and assurances regarding
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management action but can culminate inwithdrawal of funding (HEFCE, 2010, p. 28; HEFCE 2014, p. 24),2 particularly
where there are perceived risks to public funds or the interests of students (HEFCE, 2010, p. 9 and p. 26; HEFCE 2014,
p. 11 and p. 21).3
4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Resource dependence theory adopts an open system approach to predict how organisations respond and adapt
to the external environment in order to secure the resources needed to ensure survival and maintain managerial
autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Organisations will survive by managing the flow of resources and by manag-
ing their dependence on external resource providers (Fernandez, 2008; Hager, Galaskiewicz, & Larson, 2004). As
dependence increaseswith the concentration and importance of resources (Froelich, 1999), organisations that depend
heavily on a few key resource providers are likely to experience stronger constraining influences from their envi-
ronment. According to resource dependence theory, organizations are thus driven to compliance with the require-
ments of major resource providers (Froelich, 1999) and simultaneously to seeking out ways in which to reduce
dependence and maintain managerial autonomy (Fernandez, 2008; Hager et al., 2004). In a financial reporting con-
text, resource dependence theory thus predicts that universities will orientate themselves to demonstrate align-
ment with the funding bodies’ objectives by delivering high-quality financial reporting and a reputation for sound
financial management but that they will also attempt to maintain managerial autonomy when regulatory inter-
vention is threatened, as for example, when a deficit is reported. In these latter circumstances resource depen-
dence theory predicts both a reduction in financial reporting quality and that this effect will increase with resource
dependence.
Agency theory,which is focusedon thebilateral relationship betweenprincipal and agent (Jensen&Meckling, 1976)
and is founded on the conception of a rational self-interested agent, predicts that agents will act in their self-interest
even at the expense of principals. Agency theory thus predicts the management of financial performance to avoid reg-
ulatory intervention and to meet stakeholder expectations, such as analysts’ forecasts (Dechow et al., 2010). In the
private sector there is widespread evidence that managers respond to these incentives by managing earnings, using
a variety of mechanisms including accruals management (Dechow et al., 2010). In the public and not-for-profit sec-
tors, however, the incentives to manage reported financial performance are weaker. The primary objective of not-for-
profit and public sector organisations is service delivery rather than the generation of profit—university missions, for
example, are often couched in terms of education, learning, and research with little if any mention of financial per-
formance (Elwick, 2018).4 Further, although the incidence of performance-related pay has been increasing (Ballantine
et al., 2008), it remains low in comparison with the private sector and again has a focus on service delivery rather than
financial performance (The Work Foundation, 2014).5 Additionally, information asymmetry between organisational
managers and thosemonitoring and evaluating their performance is often low: regulators and funding providers often
have the power and resources to demand additional information that reduces the potential for disguising underly-
ing performance. Finally, the culture of organisations delivering public services is arguably driven by a public service
ethic rather than purely commercial concerns and characterised by a high level of ethical standards (Ferlie et al., 1996,
p.21). These factors arguably combine to create a setting in which there are few incentives to manage reported finan-
cial performance. However, the marketisation of higher education, which is a global phenomenon, has undoubtedly
strengthened the incentive framework in which universities operate. Elsewhere in the public sector there is evidence
that, in this context, managers respond to incentives particularly around the avoidance of regulatory intervention (Bal-
lantine et al., 2007; Greenwood et al., 2017) and there is widespread evidence in both the public and not-for-profit
sectors that earnings are managed so as to report small surpluses, in order to signal competence and efficiency in the
use of resources to external stakeholders. Large surpluses, in particular, are perceived as being contrary to the primary
6 GREENWOOD AND TAO
objectives and ethos of a not-for-profit enterprise whereas deficits are interpreted as a negative signal regarding the
financial viability of the organisation.
In U.K. universities, the funding providers specifically identify deficits as a cause for regulatory concern and poten-
tial intervention (HEFCE 2010; HEFCW, 2017; SFC, 2014). Deficits would also have a negative impact on universities
in the increased competition of student recruitment, which is referred to as to “the battle” in the media considering its
importance during a periodwhen direct government funding is being cut.6 Under such an environment, the perception
that a university is financially at risk could further deteriorate the organisation’s financial viability.7 In the context of
prior evidence and of the regulatory environmentwewould therefore expect universitymanagers tomanage earnings
to report small surpluses close to zero and that, in particular, they would try to avoid the reporting of deficits.
A common proxy for the intensity of monitoring in the agency-based literature in both the for-profit and not-for-
profit sectors is the extent towhich an entity’s capital or revenue is providedby a small number of institutions that have
themotivation and the resources to engage inmonitoring activities. This proxy is taken to represent theextent towhich
management responds to the monitoring activity. In the private sector, the proportion of capital held by institutional
shareholders has beenused as a proxy formonitoring intensity (Balsam,Bartov, &Marquardt, 2002;Chung et al., 2002;
Mitra & Cready, 2005) as has the proportion of long-term debt (Chung et al., 2005), while in the not-for-profit sector
Yetman and Yetman (2012) use the proportion of donations with donor restrictive clauses and in the US not-for-profit
hospital sector Krishan and Yetman (2011) use the percentage of revenue derived from the Medicare and Medicaid
programmes to reflect the intensity of regulatory oversight.
Thus, the resource dependence perspective combined with evidence from the agency-based literature, lead to our
first hypothesis:
H1: University financial reporting quality is positively associated with the dependence on funding from regulators.
Monitoring is however undertaken with a purpose and to inform decision-making. In the United Kingdom the pur-
pose of monitoring in the higher education funding regimes is to determine the need for intervention. The literature
from both the agency and resource dependence perspectives suggests that managers, in both the for-profit and not-
for-profit sectors, manage earnings to avoid regulatory intervention (Dechow et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2017).
Therefore we expect that in the setting of U.K. universities financial reporting quality will be negatively affected when
deficits are reported due to the fear of regulatory intervention and negative impacts on student recruitment hence
future financial performance. Agency theory also predicts university manager have the incentives to avoid reporting
deficits for their self-interest (Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore this leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: University financial reporting quality is negatively associated with the presence of a pre-discretionary deficit.
From the agency and resource dependence perspectives, we develop the analysis further by considering the pre-
diction that the beneficial impact of monitoring on financial reporting quality will be mitigated in the presence of a
pre-discretionary deficit. Resource dependence theory predicts that, in order to forestall loss of managerial autonomy
and to remove contextual constraints on behaviour, an organisationmay take actions to reduce the probability of being
subject to the enforcement of external demands (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) and to minimise the environmental con-
straints under which they operate (Froelich, 1999). This analysis suggests that an organisationwouldmanage earnings
to avoid the reporting of a deficit (as in H2), which is also supported by agency theory. However resource dependence
theory further predicts that organisational positioning to preserve andprotectmanagerial discretionwill increasewith
resource dependence (e.g. Froelich, 1999). Thus this leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: The positive association between financial reporting quality and the dependence of funding from regulators is
mitigated in the presence of a pre-discretionary deficit.
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5 METHOD
In this study we use discretionary accruals as an inverse measure of financial reporting quality (Dechow et al., 2010)
and, in the absence of identifiably significant specific accruals (McNichols, 2002), such as loan loss provisions in the
banking sector (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Yang, 2004) we adopt an aggregate accruals model. This is consistent with
the approach adopted in prior not-for-profit and public sector studies as in, for example, Leone and Van Horn (2005)
Ballantine et al. (2007) and Ferreira et al. (2013).
We apply the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) which is based on cash flows and which allows for the reversing
out of accruals, and which generally has greater explanatory power than those models based on Jones (1991). We
adapt this model as recommended by McNichols (2002), and applied by Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005)
and Ballantine et al. (2007) to accommodate changes in revenue and the level of Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE)
(Equation 1). Discretionary accruals are taken as the residual from an annual estimation of this model:
ΔWCit
TAit−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
(
CFOit−1
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼2
(
CFOit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼3
(
CFOit+1
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼4
(ΔREVit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼5
(
PPEit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝜀it (1)
where ΔWCit = is calculated as the change in non-cash current assets from time t−1 to time t, minus the change in
cash and minus the change in current liabilities for entity i; CFOit represents cash flow from operations; ΔREVit is the
change in revenue from time t−1 to time t;PPEit is property, plant, and equipment at time t; 𝜀it is the residual, ameasure
of discretionary accruals. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets (Dechow&Dichev, 2002).
5.1 Hypothesis 1: University financial reporting quality is positively associatedwith the
dependence on funding from regulators
As a basis for our investigation we use the model developed by Leone and Van Horn (2005) and as applied in Ferreira
et al. (2013) and Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) to investigate small surplus reporting in not-for-profit entities
through themechanismof accrualsmanagement. Thismodel,whichmodels discretionary accruals—our (inverse) proxy
for financial reporting quality— as a function of the pre-discretionary surplus/deficit, the prior year’s reported sur-
plus/deficit, and prior year discretionary accruals, is shown in Equation 2.
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit + 𝛼2Surplusit−1 + 𝛼3DAit−1 + 𝜀it (2)
where preSDit is the surplus or deficit before discretionary accruals of institution i in period t divided by total assets in
period t−1; Surplusit−1 is the reported surplus or deficit of institution i in period t−1 divided by total assets in period
t−2; and DAit−1 is the estimate of discretionary accruals of institution i in period t−1 divided by total assets in period
t−2.
Anegative coefficient (𝛼1) on preSDitwould demonstrate that discretionary accrualswould be increasingly negative,
and therefore income decreasing, as pre-discretionary surpluses increase (and vice versa). Thus, financial reporting
quality decreases with distance from financial breakeven. Prior year performance Surplusit−1 is included in the model
because there is a positive relation between past performance and current period discretionary accruals (Kothari,
Leone, & Wasley, 2005). Thus, they expect 𝛼2 to be positive. Finally, the variable DAit−1 is included in the regression
to control for the probability of autocorrelation in discretionary accruals.
To test Hypothesis 1, that university financial reporting quality increases with dependence on funding from regu-
lators, we introduce a variable representing each university’s level of funding from regulators and interact it with the
pre-discretionary surplus/deficit (Equation 3).
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit + 𝛼2RFit + 𝛼3preSDit ∗ RFit + 𝛼4Surplusit−1 + 𝛼5DAit−1 + 𝜀it (3)
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where RF is the proportion of funding from regulators expressed as a percentage of total revenue and relative to the
sample annual mean.8 The value of RF can be positive if the proportion of funding from regulators is above the annual
mean, or negative if below.9
If dependence on funding from regulators has a beneficial impact on financial reporting quality then we would
expect the coefficient on the interaction (𝛼3) to be positive, indicating that discretionary accruals are lower for a given
level of pre-discretionary performance.
To provide further evidence to support our hypothesis regarding the impact of funding from regulators on finan-
cial reporting quality we also investigate the impact of other sources of funding (research, tuition and other) which do
not exercise the same levels of monitoring as the funding bodies/regulators. We predict that there will be no signifi-
cant relationship between discretionary accruals and the proportion of funding drawn from these sources because the
dependence on individual students and other providers of revenue is low (resource dependence theory), because they
have widely differing information needs creating difficulties in contracting, and because the costs of monitoring are
disproportionately high (residual agency costs).We adapt Equation 3 to obtain Equation 4, as follows:
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit +
∑
𝛼j Sourcejit +
∑
𝛼j preSDit ∗ Sourcejit + 𝛼4Surplusit−1 + 𝛼5DAit−1 + 𝜀it (4)
where Source= the proportion of funding from regulators such as HEFCE, research councils, student tuition fees, and
others, respectively, expressed as a proportion of total revenue relative to the sample annual mean, with 1 unit being
1% of total revenue.
5.2 Hypothesis 2: University financial reporting quality is negatively associatedwith the
presence of a pre-discretionary deficit
Leone and Van Horn’s (2005) model (Equation 2), assumes a linear relationship between discretionary accruals and
the pre-discretionary surplus/deficit. However, given prior research findings and the deficit aversion signalled in the
regulatory regime, we predict that universities are subject to particularly strong incentives to avoid reporting a deficit
and that discretionary accruals, our inverse proxy for financial reporting quality, will be higher in the presence of a pre-
discretionary deficit. This is investigated by introducing a variable preDef (pre-discretionary deficit) and interacting it
with the pre-discretionary surplus/deficit (preSD).
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit + 𝛼2SDefit + 𝛼3 preSDit ∗ preDefit + 𝛼4Surplusit−1 + 𝛼5DAit−1 + 𝜀it (5)
where preDefit is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a pre-discretionary deficit, and 0 otherwise. We predict a negative
coefficient on the interaction term 𝛼3.
10 as evidence that universities adopt a more aggressive reduction in financial
reporting quality.
5.3 Hypothesis 3: The positive association between financial reporting quality and the
dependence of funding from regulators is mitigated in the presence of a pre-discretionary
deficit
We proceed to investigate the extent to which deficit aversion is affecting resource dependence by combining the
interaction of the pre-discretionary surplus/deficit with both pre-discretionary deficit and funding from regulators as
follows:
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit + 𝛼2SDefit + 𝛼3RFit + 𝛼4 preSDit ∗ RFit + 𝛼5 preSDit ∗ preDefit
+ 𝛼6 preSDit ∗ preDefit ∗ RFit + 𝛼7Surplusit−1 + 𝛼8DAit−1 + 𝜀it (6)
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With reference to prior agency-based literature this model will also indicate the extent to whichmonitoring by reg-
ulators (as proxied by the variable RF) moderates the strong incentive to avoid reporting a deficit.
6 SAMPLE AND DATA
Data from the audited financial statements of all U.K. universities that receive government funding for the period
from2002 to 2015were collected from theHigher Education Statistics Association (HESA)11 database, resulting in an
unbalanced panel data set. Our sample generates a total of 1,973 university-year observations. However, the require-
ment for lagged and leading variables for the modified version of the Dechow and Dichev model (Francis et al., 2005;
McNichols, 2002) thatwe use as our primary estimator of discretionary accruals reduces the sample to 1,827 observa-
tions and this reduced further to 1,683 observations for our multivariate analysis.
7 FINDINGS
7.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 sets out the context for our study by providing a range of descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that over the
period of this study themean revenue of universities was £161m, of which the 32%was provided by the funding body
grant (mean £52m). University revenue grew (untabulated) from £105m in 2003 to £211m in 2014. The comparable
figure for mean assets is £269 m. The mean reported surplus amounts to just £4.9 m representing 3.0% of mean rev-
enue, providing prima facie evidence of the tendency to report small surpluses close to zero. Student-related income
is also a significant source of revenue representing 31% of mean revenue over the period. This is followed by research
funding at 17% and other sources of income at 20%, including endowment. Panel B further shows funding body grant
has decreased as a percentage of total revenue over 40% in 2008 to 21% in 2014.
With respect to the key performance figure of the reported surplus or deficit, Panel C proceeds to provide further
details of the “within” and “between” variations of scaled reported surplus/deficits (scaled by lagged total assets). This
panel shows that the within variation (variation across time for each university) at 4.4% is greater than the between
variation of 1.8%. Panel D shows that themean surplus/deficit for each year scaled by total revenue ranges from1.74%
to 3.99%during the sample periodwhile Panel E shows that 12% (199/1,683) of observations reported a deficit during
the sample period. Figure 1 further provides the distribution of the scaled reported surplus/deficit. As shown in the
figure the distribution peaks around the bins between 0% and 2.5% of lagged total assets and in comparison, the bins
in relation to small deficits have far fewer observations.
7.2 Multivariate analysis
All ourmultivariate analysis has been conducted using panel data regression techniques. In each case, after conducting
a Hausman test, which indicated that a random effect regression was not appropriate, we have used and reported the
findings for fixed effect regressions.
7.2.1 Estimation of discretionary accruals
We estimate discretionary accruals, our inverse proxy for financial reporting quality, as being the difference between
the actual and expected value of accruals based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (as adapted by McNichols
[2002]), the Jones model (Jones, 1991), and the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). The results
of these estimations are presented in the Appendix which shows that, consistent with prior research, the explanatory
power of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) models (Models 1 and 2) is greater than that of the Jones models (Models
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of funding sources
N Mean SD Min
Lower
quartile Median
Upper
quartile Max
Total revenue (£’000) 1,683 161,490 169,522 5,215 59,162 118,318 188,686 1,504,477
Total assets (£’000) 1,683 269,416 385,481 28 85,531 166,897 300,192 4,592,502
Surplus/Deficit (£’000) 1,683 4,923 9,592 −58,810 287 2,270 6,824 94,704
Funding body grant (£’000) 1,683 52,230 42,913 622 22,457 41,297 66,187 257,815
Student tuition fees (£’000) 1,683 50,307 44,702 405 17,423 39,114 70,733 351,724
Research funding (£’000) 1,683 26,842 53,551 0 1,460 6,039 26,338 471,957
Other income (£’000) 1,683 29,929 50,634 0 8,243 17,850 32,985 722,600
Endowment (£’000) 1,683 2,128 4,777 0 320 787 1,887 63,888
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of funding body grant (funding from regulators) as a percentage of total revenue by year
Year N Mean SD Min Max
2003 137 43.73 11.44 7.33 69.51
2004 139 44.20 12.15 7.50 83.61
2005 140 44.13 12.21 8.23 81.16
2006 141 44.24 12.12 8.91 80.75
2007 141 43.12 11.35 8.51 77.82
2008 142 41.69 11.08 8.16 73.21
2009 142 39.97 10.95 7.60 72.00
2010 142 38.68 10.45 8.85 71.59
2011 141 36.60 10.33 6.79 69.32
2012 139 33.77 9.69 6.98 67.51
2013 139 26.71 9.30 6.77 69.15
2014 140 21.38 10.27 6.18 69.00
Total 1,683 38.19 13.07 6.18 83.61
Panel C:Within and between variations of reported surplus/deficit (scaled by lagged total assets)
Mean SD Min Max Observations
Overall 0.028 0.047 −0.404 1.045 N= 1,683
Between 0.018 −0.028 0.107 n= 143
Within 0.044 −0.348 0.966 T= 11.77
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of reported surplus/deficit by year
Year N Mean SD Min Max
2003 137 1.74% 2.44% −7.00% 11.22%
2004 139 2.67% 4.75% −4.96% 44.24%
2005 140 1.96% 2.76% −4.69% 13.42%
2006 141 2.90% 6.63% −5.83% 51.62%
2007 141 2.31% 3.56% −6.08% 22.46%
2008 142 3.36% 4.31% −15.58% 18.78%
2009 142 2.71% 9.36% −14.36% 104.46%
2010 142 2.17% 5.31% −40.40% 12.98%
2011 141 3.99% 3.16% −3.31% 13.29%
(Continues)
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TABLE 1 Continued
Year N Mean SD Min Max
2012 139 3.16% 2.73% −4.30% 11.21%
2013 139 3.17% 3.08% −4.96% 16.03%
2014 140 3.13% 2.77% −4.91% 12.16%
Total 1,683 2.77% 4.71% −40.40% 104.46%
Panel E: Frequency of reported surplus and deficit by year
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Reported Deficit 21 16 21 27 20 10 28 21 7 9 8 11 199
Reported Surplus 116 123 119 114 121 132 114 121 134 130 131 129 1,484
Total 137 139 140 141 141 142 142 142 141 139 139 140 1,683
F IGURE 1 Distribution of reported surplus/deficit
Notes: The distribution of reported surplus/deficit scaled by lagged total assets. The distribution interval width, which
is calculated using as 2(IQR)n−1/3, in accordance with Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), is approximately
0.005. The first interval to the right of zero contains all observations in the interval [0, 0.005), the second interval
contains [0.005, 0.01), and so on.
3 and 4). Further, Model 2, which includes long-term provisions and depreciation in the calculation of the change in
working capital (Ballantine et al., 2007), has greater explanatory power (11.1%) than Model 1 (9.4%) and is therefore
adopted as the primary estimator of discretionary accruals for the purposes of our investigations.
Prior to our multivariate analysis we provide in Table 2 descriptive statistics on discretionary accruals and the pre-
discretionary surplus/deficit (PanelA), other key variables (Panel B), and correlation coefficients (PanelC). Key variable
definitions are given in Panel D.
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of key variables
Panel A: Summary of pre-discretionary surplus/deficit and discretionary accruals (scaled by lagged total assets)
N Mean SD Min Max
Discretionary accruals (DA) 1,683 0.000 0.065 −0.568 0.680
Positive 854 0.041 0.050 0.000 0.663
Negative 829 −0.042 0.048 −0.574 0.000
Pre-discretionary surplus/deficit
(preSD)
1,683 0.029 0.074 −0.355 1.108
Surplus 1,209 0.053 0.062 0.000 1.105
Deficit 474 −0.036 0.046 −0.375 0.000
Panel B: Summary of other key variables
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
preDef 1,683 0.276 0.439 0.000 1.000
RF 1,683 0.000 10.95 −36.68 47.62
Tuition 1,683 0.000 11.58 −49.89 48.26
Research 1,683 0.000 11.59 −10.96 54.55
OtherIncome 1,683 0.000 7.13 −18.04 35.88
Surplus 1,683 0.028 0.047 −0.216 1.045
Panel C: Pearson correlation table
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DA (1) 1
preSD(2) −0.76* 1
preDef(3) 0.49* −0.57* 1
RF (4) 0.04 0.04 0.03 1
Tuition (5) 0.04 0.01 0 −0.15* 1
Research (6) −0.09* 0.01 −0.04 −0.51* −0.61* 1
OtherIncome (7) 0.01 −0.09* 0 −0.41* −0.37* 0.13* 1
Surplus (8) 0.03 0.10* −0.07* 0.12* 0.09* −0.13* −0.11* 1
Panel D: Variable definitions
Variables Definitions
DA Discretionary accruals obtained from the accrual model (Equation 1).
Surplus Reported surplus or deficit scaled by lagged total assets.
preSD Pre-discretionary surplus or deficit, (calculated as reported surplus/deficit minus discretionary
accruals, consistent with related literature), scaled by lagged total assets. A surplus has a positive
value, a deficit has a negative value.
preDef A dummy variable equals to 1 if there is a deficit before discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise.
Source Sources of funding
RF Funding from regulators (funding body grant) expressed as a percentage of total revenue relative to
the sample annual mean.
Tuition Tuition fees expressed as a percentage of total revenue relative to the sample annual mean.
Research Research-related income expressed as a percentage of total revenue relative to the sample annual
mean.
OtherIncome Other income expressed as a percentage of total revenue relative to the sample annual mean.
Panel B Note: All variables are defined in Panel D
Panel C Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 2
Panel D.
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TABLE 3 Influence of external monitoring
Dependent variable DA DA DA DA
Models Model A Model B Model C Model D
preSD −0.852*** −0.849*** −0.848*** −0.848***
RF 0.000 −0.001** 0.001 0.001
preSD× RF 0.015*** 0.017** 0.014** 0.015***
Tuition 0.002* 0.001***
preSD× Tuition −0.003 −0.002
Research −0.002*** −0.001
preSD× Research 0.002 0.000
OtherIncome −0.001*** 0.000
preSD×OtherIncome 0.002 −0.001
Surplust−1 0.060 0.046 0.048 0.047
DAt−1 −0.040* −0.043* −0.041* −0.042*
Constant 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,683 1,683 1,683 1,683
R-squared 0.644 0.65 0.649 0.65
Number of universities 143 143 143 143
Note: This table presents the results from panel data regression estimations of the impact of sources of funding on the level of
discretionary accruals. All regressions use fixed effect with year control included. Robust standard errors are reported in the
table.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Model A:
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit + 𝛼2RFit + 𝛼3preSDit ∗ RFit + 𝛼4Surplusit−1 + 𝛼5DAit−1 + 𝜀it
Models B–D:
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit +
∑
𝛼j Sourcejit +
∑
𝛼j preSDit ∗ Sourcejit + 𝛼4Surplusit−1 + 𝛼5DAit−1 + 𝜀it
Source: j refers to the source of funding (j= RF, Tuition, Research, or Other). All other variables are defined in Table 2 Panel D.
7.2.2 Hypothesis 1: University financial reporting quality is positively associatedwith the
dependence on funding from regulators
Table 3Model A shows the results of our test of Hypothesis 1. The coefficient on the pre-discretionary surplus/deficit
(preSD) is negative at −0.85 (p < 0.01). This is consistent with the evidence from prior studies (Ferreira et al., 2013;
Leone & Van Horn, 2005; Verbruggen & Christiaens, 2012). As predicted, the coefficient on the interaction term
preSD*RF is positive (0.015, p < 0.01) indicating that financial-reporting quality (proxied inversely by discretionary
accruals) improves with increasing levels of funding from regulators. For example, for a university with funding from
regulators which is 10 percentage points above the sample annual mean, discretionary accruals are 70% of the scaled
pre-discretionary surplus/deficit. The comparable figure for a university with funding from regulators which is 10 per-
centage points below the sample annual mean is 100%.12
To provide further evidence to support our hypothesis regarding the impact of monitoring on financial reporting
qualityModels B, C, andD show the effect of introducing other sources of funding into the regression. In each case the
results for funding from regulators are similar to those for Model A in both size and significance, whereas the interac-
tion of preSDwith other sources of funding is inconclusive.
In summary, Table 3 provides support for Hypothesis 1 that financial reporting quality is positively associated with
the dependence on funding from regulators.
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TABLE 4 Deficit reporting avoidance
Dependent variable DA
preSD −0.569***
preDef 0.007
preSD× preDef −0.445**
Surplus t−1 0.058
DA t−1 −0.035*
Constant 0.002
Year control Yes
Observations 1,683
R-squared 0.624
Number of universities 143
Note: This table presents the results from panel data regression estimations of the impact of pre-discretionary deficit on the
level of discretionary accruals. The regressions use fixed effectwith year control included. Robust standard errors are reported
in the table.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit + 𝛼2preDefit + 𝛼3 preSDit ∗ preDefit + 𝛼4Surplusit−1 + 𝛼5DAit−1 + 𝜀it
All variables are defined in Table 2 Panel D
TABLE 5 Comparison of surplus/deficit before and after pre-discretionary accruals
Reported deficit (after
discretionary accruals)
Reported surplus (after
discretionary accruals) Total
Pre-discretionary deficit 93 381 474
20% 80% 100%
Pre-discretionary -surplus 106 1,103 1,209
9% 91% 100%
Pearson 𝜒2
1
= 38.47 Pr= 0.000.
7.2.3 Hypothesis 2: University financial reporting quality is negatively associatedwith the presence
of a pre-discretionary deficit
Table 4 reports the results from Equation 5 that investigates whether financial reporting quality is low in the presence
of a pre-discretionary deficit. The coefficient on the pre-discretionary surplus/deficit is negative (−0.569, p < 0.01)
and, as predicted, the coefficient on the interaction is also negative, and large at−0.445 (p< 0.05). The results indicate
that, in the presence of a pre-discretionary deficit a university would increase discretionary accruals from 57% of the
pre-discretionary deficit to 101% (0.569 ± 0.445), which would transform the pre-discretionary deficit into a small
reported surplus.
These findings support Hypothesis 2 that university financial reporting quality is negatively associated with the
presence of a pre-discretionary deficit, a proxy for the threat of regulatory intervention.
Table 5 sheds further light on this phenomenon by showing a comparison of the surplus or deficit before and
after discretionary accruals. It can be seen that 80% (381 out of 474) of observations with a pre-discretionary deficit
reported a surplus (𝜒2
1
= 38.5, p= 0.00).
7.2.4 Hypothesis 3: The positive association between financial reporting quality and the
dependence of funding from regulators is mitigated in the presence of a pre-discretionary deficit
Table 6 shows the results of Equation 6 that testsHypothesis 3. The coefficient on the pre-discretionary surplus/deficit
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TABLE 6 Interaction of external monitoring and deficit reporting avoidance
Dependent variables DA
preSD −0.826***
preDef −0.003
preSD× preDef −0.166**
RF −0.001***
preSD× RF 0.020***
preDef× RF 0.001***
preDef× RF× preSD −0.022**
Surplus t−1 0.075
**
DA t−1 −0.033
Constant 0.011***
Year control Yes
Observations 1,683
R-squared 0.673
Number of universities −0.826***
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
DAit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1preSDit + 𝛼2preDefit + 𝛼3RFit + 𝛼4 preSDit∗RFit + 𝛼5 preSDit∗preDefit
+ 𝛼6 preSDit∗preDefit∗RFit + 𝛼7Surplusit−1 + 𝛼8DAit−1 + 𝜀it
All variables are defined in Table 2 Panel C.
(preSD) is similar to that in Table 3 (−0.826, p < 0.01) as is the interaction with RF (0.020, p < 0.01). The combined
interaction term, preDef*preSD*RF, is however negative (−0.022, p< 0.01) and is greater inmagnitude than the positive
coefficient on the interaction term (preSD*RF, coefficient 0.020). Thus in the presence of a pre-discretionary deficit,
financial reporting quality actually decreases with increased funding from regulators such as HEFCE. The net effect is
that discretionary accruals are 0.2 % (0.022–0.020) higher in relation to pre-discretionary deficits for every additional
unit13 of funding from regulators.14
In summary our findings indicate that, dependence on funding from regulators (which is also a proxy for monitor-
ing intensity) has a beneficial impact on university financial reporting quality but that this is more than offset in the
presence of a pre-discretionary deficit, a proxy for the threat of regulatory intervention.
7.2.5 Robustness testing
Wehave conducted a number of robustness checks on our findings. First, we test formulticollinearity by examining the
Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for eachof the regressionmodels.Noneof theVIF scores is above10, andwe therefore
conclude thatmulticollinearity is not a serious concern (Kennedy, 1998). Second,we testwhether the findings reported
in Tables 3–6 are robust to the choice of estimator for discretionary accruals (panel vs. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS))
and to the alternative accrual model represented by Model 1 in the Appendix. Third, we test the influence of possible
outliers bywinsorising discretionary accruals and pre-discretionary surplus/deficit at the 1st and 99th percentiles.We
find that, in all cases, the results are similar in both economic and statistical significance.
Then, albeit that universities are a relatively homogenous group of not-for-profit entities, we test the robustness of
the findings to the inclusion of other control variables. We control first for the age of the University, measured from
the date of its establishment as a University. Older universities tend to be better endowed, more financially stable,
and less dependent on student-related revenues than younger universities and theremay be other distinctive features
that additionally influence their propensity to manage reported financial performance. The findings in Tables 3–6 are
robust, for each of statistical and economic significance, to the inclusion of first, a continuous age variable and second,
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a categorical variable based on the three main periods of expansion in the university sector: prior to 1960, from 1960
to 1992 and from 1992 onwards. We further investigate whether there might be a London effect, as London is a sig-
nificant attraction for many students, particularly overseas students. There was no such effect. Similarly, we include
a variable that, at least partially, controls for organisational heterogeneity by including a dummy variable if the Uni-
versity is one which is primarily an arts or music institution. These institutions tend to be smaller and have a much
narrower curriculum than other universities. The inclusion of this variable had no impact on the findings.
8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we extend the literature on not-for-profit and public sector financial reporting quality by investigating
the impact of funding from regulators on university financial reporting quality. While agency problems arise in both
not-for-profit and for-profit settings we recognise the limitations of agency theory in a not-for-profit setting (Stein-
berg, 2010; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012) by adopting both agency and resource dependence theories as complementary
frameworks for our analysis. A distinctive feature of our study is the investigation, for the first time in the not-for-profit
setting, of the interaction of themonitoring and incentive effects of regulation.
Our setting is U.K. universities, data for which were accessed over a period of 14 years from 2002 to 2015. These
institutionsderive a significant proportionof their revenue fromthe sector regulators suchasHEFCE. The fundingbod-
ies and regulators operate a risk-based regulatory regime of progressive monitoring and intervention. An assessment
of organisational financial sustainability, of which surplus/deficit is a key indicator, is a significant part of this regime.
In summary we find that, consistent from both agency and resource dependence perspectives, financial report-
ing quality is positively associated with the dependence of funding from regulators (Hypothesis 1), a proxy for both
resource dependence and monitoring intensity, and that financial reporting quality decreases to avoid deficit report-
ing, a proxy for the threat of regulatory intervention (Hypothesis 2). Further, the positive association between finan-
cial reporting quality and the dependence on funding from regulators is highly mitigated by the presence of a pre-
discretionary deficit (Hypothesis 3). The results show that these effects combine to result in the conversion of most
pre-discretionary deficits into reported surpluses.
This study provides a robust framework for explaining the impact of regulatory monitoring on financial reporting
quality and demonstrates the value of combining agency and resource dependency perspectives to explain short-term
tactical accounting choices in response to regulatory threats. The evidence presented here indicates that, in terms of
financial reporting quality, short-term responses to regulation can act in tension to longer term responses.More specif-
ically, for those most resource dependent, the strength of the short-term response to preserve managerial autonomy
can exceed the longer term strategic response of generating a reputation for good financial reporting quality and sound
financial management. This interaction between short-term and long-term responses to resource dependency is wor-
thy of further empirical and analytical investigation.
There are some limitations to our research. Accruals based methods of investigating earnings management have
been subject to criticism (see for example, Walker, 2013). However, this method is widely adopted in both for-profit
(Dechow et al., 2010; Walker, 2013) and not-for-profit settings. Further, in the absence of a capital markets setting,
other empirical archival methods for investigating earnings management are not available for the public and not-for-
profit sectors. Nonetheless, further empirical research in the university setting adopting alternativemethods, whether
quantitative or qualitative, would be beneficial to our understanding of the factors influencing financial reporting qual-
ity. Access to TRAC information for example would facilitate a study of the management of cost allocations as has
previously been conducted in a US not-for-profit setting (Jones & Roberts, 2006; Krishnan & Yetman, 2011; Krishnan,
Yetman, & Yetman, 2006).
The findings of this study are not only of interest for the regulation of higher education sector internationally, but
alsohave implications that gobeyond this sectorwith similar fundingand regulatorymechanisms. In theongoing search
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formore efficient andeffective public services (Hyndman&Lapsley, 2016) thedelivery of public services is increasingly
being devolved to not-for-profit, for-profit, and semi-autonomous public sector entities (Office of Fair Trading, 2010,
p. 4;Wollman &Marcou, 2010). To protect public money there has been, alongside this trend, a corresponding growth
in regulatory bodies whose aim is to ensure that recipients of public funding are financially sound and that the funds
provided are used for the purposes intended (Black, 2005; Black & Baldwin, 2010; HM Treasury, 2013). The effective-
ness of these regulatory regimes is dependent, inter alia, upon the quality of financial reporting by regulated entities.
Our findings thus have a number of policy and practice implications for the regulators and auditors of public sector and
not-for-profit entities, and to service commissioning bodies such as central government departments, local authori-
ties, and municipalities. In particular, regulatory reliance on financial reporting may need to be tempered when there
is heavy dependence on funding from regulators andwhen entities report performance close to financial thresholds of
regulatory significance.
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NOTES
1 There are four different funding bodies in the United Kingdom which are responsible to allocate government funding to
higher education institutions. They are Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE, replaced by Office for
Students (OFS) in April 2018); Scottish Funding Council for Scotland (SFC); Higher Education Funding Council for Wales
(HFECW); and the Department for Economy (DfE, for Northern Ireland).
2 This remains the case under theOFS systemwhere a range of interventions are available to theOFS ranging fromadditional
monitoring to “suspension” and “de-registration” (OFS 2018 p. 53, HERA 2017, s19) effectively preventing an institution
from operating as a higher education provider.
3 In December 2009HEFCE threatened towithdraw funding from LondonMetropolitan University after themisreporting of
student numbers. By July 2010 only 4 of the 15 Governors of the University had survived. Included in resignations were
the Chair of the Governing Body, the Vice-Chancellor, the Chair of the Audit Committee, and the Chair of the Finance
Committee.
4 See for example, the University of Cambridge mission statement, https://www.cam.ac.uk/about-the-university/how-the-
university-and-colleges-work/the-universitys-mission-and-core-values
5 In the context of English Universities the recent public debate about Vice Chancellor pay, the HEFCE intervention
at the University of Bath, and evidence that the adverse publicity has had an impact on student applications, pro-
vides evidence that private sector type reward packages can be counter-productive in a public/not-for-profit setting.
(http://www.bathchronicle.co.uk/news/bath-news/something-gone-very-wrong-probe-260701;
6 Seehttps://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/aug/17/prestigious-universities-edge-out-rivals-uk-battle-for-students.
University admissions clearing house, Ucas, reported that record numbers had been recruited a day after hun-
dreds of thousands of students received their A-level results across England, Wales and Northern Ireland. See
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/aug/17/prestigious-universities-edge-out-rivals-uk-battle-for-students.
7 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-46059457.
8 Funding from regulators declines over the period of our study but this does not of itself imply that the regulators/funding
bodies has reduced the intensity of its scrutiny. The evidence suggests the opposite (Lapsley &Miller, 2004; Parker, 2013),
Thus, by measuring each University’s funding in relation to the sample annual mean we investigate the relative impact
of funding from regulators as between those with relatively high levels and those with relatively low levels of funding at
any point in time. Further, from a theoretical perspective, this procedure provides efficient estimations whilst allowing for
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explanatory variables that are relatively low in variability (Wooldridge, 2010). An example of the application of this tech-
nique can be found in Chang, Dasgupta, & Hilary, 2009).
9 If the sample annual mean for funding from regulators is 30% and the observation has a value of 33%, the value of the
variable RFwill be+3.
10When preDef =1 (ie there is a pre-discretionary deficit) and 𝛼3 is also negative, the combined effect is to demonstrate that
there has been an incremental reduction in financial reporting quality (𝛼1+𝛼3+𝛼1).
11 HESA is the designated body used by HEFCE and OfS for the collection and dissemination of data relating to
Higher Education Institutions. Universities submit data in relation to finance, staff and student to HESA annually. See
http://hesa.ac.uk/about/regulation/statutory.
12 From Table 3, the coefficient on preSD is (−0.85) and the coefficient on the interaction with RF is+0.015. Thus, when fund-
ing from regulators (RF) as a percentage of total revenue is 10 percentage points above the sample annual mean, DA is
−0.85+0.015×10=−0.70.When RF is 10 percentage points below themeanDA is−0.85+0.015× (−10)=−1.00.
13 One unit is 1/100 of total revenue.
14 Similarly discretionary accrualswill increaseby0.2% for everyunit of funding fromregulatorsbelow the sample annualmean.
In these circumstances, preSD×RF=−0.020 and preDef×RF×preSD=+ 0.022. (−0.020+0.022= 0.002).
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 Accrual models regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables 𝚫WC
Asmodel 1 but
including change in
long term provisions
and depreciation Jonesmodel
Modified Jones
model
CFOit-1 0.148
***
0.121
***
CFOit −0.270*** −0.313***
CFOit+1 0.147*** 0.064**
ΔREVit −0.010* −0.145*** −0.021***
PPE −0.038*** −0.048*** −0.038*** −0.041***
ΔREVit-ΔRECit −0.205***
Constant 0.025
** −0.002** 0.213** 0.024**
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1827 1827 1827 1827
R-squared 0.094 0.111 0.056 0.072
Note: The results are from accrual models regression. Robust standard errors are reported in the table. ***, **, * denote signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Model 1:
ΔWCit
TAit−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
(
CFOit−1
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼2
(
CFOit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼3
(
CFOit+1
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼4
(ΔREVit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼5
(
PPEit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝜀it
ΔWCit = ΔCAit − ΔCASHit − ΔCLit
whereΔWCit is the change in working capital accrual,ΔCAit means the change in current assets,ΔCASHit presents the
change in cash in hand,ΔCLit stands for the change in current liabilities, TAit−1 is the total assets, CFOit is the operating
cash flow,ΔREVit represents change of total income from year t to year t−1, PPEit is the property, plant, and equipment
in year t and 𝜀it is the residual.
Model 2 is similar toModel 1. The dependent variable inModel 2ΔWCit includes the change of long-term provision
and depreciation.
The JonesModel used is:
ACCit
TAit−1
= 𝛼1
(
1
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼2
(ΔREVit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼3
(
PPEit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝜀it
whereACCitmeans total accruals in year t,ΔREVit represents changeof total income fromyear t to year t−1,PPEit is the
property, plant, and equipment in year t. The error term from the equation can be treated as ameasure of discretionary
accruals.
TheModified JonesModel used is:
ACCit
TAit−1
= 𝛼1
(
1
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼2
(ΔREVit − ΔRECit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝛼3
(
PPEit
TAit−1
)
+ 𝜀it
whereΔRECit represents the changes in receivables.
